drivers and barriers to institutional change by Rennkamp, Britta
 Trading off climate change mitigation 
and poverty reduction in South Africa: 
drivers and barriers to institutional change 

























  2 
Suggested citation for this paper: 
Rennkamp, Britta (2016): Trading off climate change mitigation and poverty 
reduction in South Africa: drivers and barriers to institutional change, ERC 
Research Report, Cape Town, Conference Paper accepted at the Berlin 








Energy Research Centre 
University of Cape Town 




Tel: +27 (0)21 650 2521  
Fax: +27 (0)21 650 2830  
Email: erc@erc.uct.ac.za 






















  3 
Abstract  
 
The assumption that there will be trade-offs between climate change mitigation 
measures and poverty reduction measures goes largely unchallenged in the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. This paper analyses 
how these trade-offs unfold at the national level in South Africa. South Africa is a 
middle income country that exemplifies the challenge of accommodating efforts 
for emissions reductions and poverty reduction at the same time. The paper 
analyses the trade-offs and distributional conflicts that drive and hinder 
institutional change in the current climate policy regime. The analysis focuses on 
three regulatory regimes in climate change: the climate change response white 
paper, the carbon tax and the renewable energy program. A combination of 
interview-based qualitative research and an innovative discourse network analysis 
reveals the discourse between competing coalitions supporting and opposing 
specific interventions. We find in the case of South Africa that the lack of 
economic growth over the last few years has kept emissions levels relatively low 
and consequently postponed the hard trade-offs between climate change 
mitigation and poverty reduction. Trade-offs appear in the political discourse, 
especially around the carbon tax and carbon budgets. Yet, distributional conflicts 
determine both drivers and barriers to institutional change. Powerful coalitions 
opposing the carbon tax managed to push the government into postponing the 
implementation of the tax. We conclude that win-win situations are possible, and 
that the crux lies in the implementation. A carbon tax proposal has made 
provisions for off-setting emissions through investment in clean technologies in 
low income communities. The renewable energy program created large foreign 
investment influx into the country, which is partially spent on community 
development. The main challenge in creating win-win situations is overcoming 
the distributional conflicts. Lack of policy coordination, alignment and clarity of 
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1 Introduction  
 
The assumption of a trade-off between climate change mitigation and poverty 
reduction generally goes unchallenged. The members of the negotiations under 
the United Nations established this trade-off in the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), arguing that climate change responses must take 
“into full account the legitimate priority needs of developing countries for the 
achievement of sustained economic growth and the eradication of poverty” 
(UNFCCC 1992). Developing countries can, in theory, call for support under the 
principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”, but attempts to support 
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) have not, to date,  
materialized at a large scale. 
It remains unclear how these trade-offs unfold at the national level in 
developing countries. This question is relevant, because the Convention has 
increasingly emphasized the role of national contributions for climate protection 
in the post Kyoto regime (COP 19). The majority of member states expressed 
their intentions for emissions reductions in the form of Intended Nationally 
Determined Contribution (INDCs) submitted to the UNFCCC in the course of 
2015. These contributions are only meaningful if actually implemented. The risks 
of national climate policies failing to reduce emissions is amongst the main 
threats to climate protection (UNESCO 2013). The implementation of national 
contributions depends on the success and failure of national development and 
climate policies, because the INDCs usually relate closely to national policies. 
This paper examines how the trade-offs between climate change 
mitigation and poverty reduction measures unfold in the South African climate 
policy discourse. South Africa exemplifies the challenge of simultaneous efforts  
to reduce emissions and boost socio-economic development that many 
developing nations share. The country’s per capita emissions range is similar to 
Germany’s, while the GDP falls into the World Bank’s category of higher middle 
income countries. 39% of the population lives below the national poverty line of 
390 ZAR/ 25 EUR per household per month. 
The paper analyzes how these trade-offs and consequent distributional 
conflicts shape coalitions which may drive or hinder institutional change.1 The 
research builds on the literature on institutional change in the political economy, 
the role of conflicts in institutional and policy change, discourse coalitions and 
the roles of interest, ideas, common knowledge and power relations between the 
actors making up supporting or opposing coalitions. The paper identifies both 
drivers and barriers to institutional change in climate change policy based on this 
research literature and the empirical analysis of three climate change mitigation 
policies which are used as case studies, namely:  
                                               
1 Trade-offs can be defined as decision-making conflicts, as actors may want to achieve two 
objectives, but can only achieve one with the existing means. Distributional conflicts are more 
immediate interest-driven conflicts between actors about who gets what. 
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i) the national climate change response white paper;  
ii) the carbon tax; and  
iii) the renewable energy program.  
 
The analysis contextualizes these policies within the dynamics in the political  
economy and major events (Thelen 2005). The research combines a qualitative 
research strategy with a discourse network analysis (Leifeld 2012) which 
represents the coalitions and the arguments they use to support or oppose a 
specific climate policy. The dataset consists of 789 statements from primary data 
in the media, parliamentary notes and public comments on specific policies, as 
well as 21 interviews. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section Two presents an overview of the 
existing literature explaining  drivers and barriers to institutional and policy 
change and the role of conflicts and coalitions in driving or hindering institutional 
change. Section Three elaborates on the methodology and research design chosen 
for this analysis. Section Four presents the analysis of South Africa’s political 
economy dynamics, and of drivers and barriers to institutional change in the three 
case studies. Section Five presents a synthesis of the findings and conclusions. 
2 Trade-offs, distributional conflicts and the role of coalitions in shaping 
institutional change  
 
The literature review incorporates the research literature which addresses  the 
respective roles of trade-offs, distributional conflicts and discourse coalitions in 
driving or constraining institutional change. The section clarifies definitions of 
institutional change and how it relates to policy change. It summarises 
conclusions from the literature with respect to issues such as how trade-offs and 
distributional conflicts relate to each other, how conflicts shape coalitions, and 
how coalitions shape institutional change. The section closes with an analytical 
framework that summarises the relationships between those factors and actors 
that drive institutional change.  
 
2.1 A glance at the literature on drivers and barriers to institutional change 
 
Institutions provide the framework under which a society operates, and 
explaining institutional change has occupied academics in various disciplines for  
decades. The result is a sizable body of research literature across the fields of 
economic studies, sociology, political science and history.  
The study of institutional change starts with the definition of ‘institution’.  
The most common definition describes institutions “as the rules of the game in a 
society, […] the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction, [that] 
structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or economic” 
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(North 1990, p.3.). Others add political characteristics to the nature of institutions 
defining them as “distributional instruments laden with power implications” 
(Hall 1986, Skocpol 1995, Mahoney 2010 cit in Mahoney and Thelen 2010). This 
definition puts distributional conflicts and power implications at the centre of the 
‘rules of the game’. Another important aspect emerging from the definitions is 
that institutions are never static, but constantly evolving, which builds change 
into the nature of institutions (Ostrom and Basurto 2010). 
Not every policy is necessarily an institution. Only those policies that 
establish rules which affect actors in a society as a whole, not only the decision 
makers, are institutions. The implementation and legitimation of these policies 
depends on actors in both the private and public sectors. A retirement sector 
reform, if promulgated through formal channels and taking into account the 
results of public consultation, would be an institution, but  a military intervention 
would typically not be (Streeck and Thelen 2005). The concept of institutional 
change derives from policies which stipulate changes in the rules that affect the 
political economy. Individual policies and  institutions cumulatively amount to a 
regime. This view of institutional change differs slightly from conventional policy 
analysis, which focuses on specific policy intervention in economic sub-systems.  
Both institutional and policy change perspectives offer concepts to explain 
drivers and barriers to the public policy interventions that promote emissions 
reductions and poverty eradication. Mitigation policies consist of individual 
policies, like the carbon tax, the climate change legislation and the renewable 
energy program. In their sum, along with other interventions, they address 
institutional change towards a cleaner, less carbon intensive development 
pathway. The aim is to transform the existing fossil fuel intensive economy 
towards a cleaner, greener, less carbon intensive economy in the long term. These 
policies clearly count as institutions or rules in Streeck and Thelen’s (2005) 
understanding, because their implementation and legitimation depends on 
support from coalitions in the private and public sectors. Decision-makers alone 
cannot implement these policies with meaningful outcomes.   
The frameworks used for policy analysis, such as the  advocacy coalition 
framework (Sabatier 1988) and the concept of discourse coalitions (Hajer 1993) 
share a similar focus on the long term with the historical institutionalism methods 
(Streeck and Thelen 2005) in their theory of change. They also focus on long, ten-
year periods of change and take the wider political economic context into 
account, including external and internal systems events, cleavages and conflicts.nt 
(Sabatier 1988, Weible and Sabatier 2009). The analytical framework for this 
study integrates aspects from both institutional and policy change literature. 
 
2.2 Institutional change in the developing world  
 
The research on institutions and institutional change derives mostly from 
evidence in modern capitalist democracies in the Northern hemisphere. For the 
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purpose of this paper it is necessary to draw on additional literature from 
development studies to describe the nature of institutions and institutional change 
in developing countries. The role of informal institutions in the society has not 
been addressed in depth in the research literature on institutional change, because 
most of the evidence comes from wealthy capitalist economies. The literature in 
African studies establishes the concept of neopatrimonialism, which refers to a 
political system with formal structures of rule that co-exist along with strong 
informal institutions. In neopatrimonial political systems, informality plays a 
much bigger role than in Western capitalist democracies. This phenomenon can 
be conceptualized as institutionalized informality. Neopatrimonial states show 
high levels of insecurity about the behavior of state institutions. The political 
system reflects this insecurity, which  makes institutional change difficult to 
predict and governments actions not calculable (Erdmann and Engel 2007). This 
concept is a valuable addition to the literature on institutions and institutional 
change from African political and economic literature, which in return can 
benefit from the insights of the theory on institutional change drawn from 
Northern hemisphere literature.   
 
2.3 Definitions: Institutions, policies and determinants of change  
 
For the purpose of this research, institutions can be defined as sets of formal rules 
that organize the interactions between the state, business and society as a whole. 
The state has the mandate for rule setting in negotiation processes with actors in 
society, subject to the legitimacy of these rules. In neopatrimonial systems, formal 
institutions coevolve with parallel informal ways of rule setting, which may 
compromise the transparency of institutional change. Institutions may create or 
solve distributional conflicts, which makes them powerful instruments by virtue 
of the losses and gains that they imply. This definition draws on elements of the 
work of North (1990), Streek and Thelen (2005), Mahoney and Thelen (2009), 
Ostrom and Basurto (2010), Erdmann and Engel (2007) as an attempt to 
contribute to a better understanding of institutional change in developing nations. 
The existing research literature offers valuable explanations for 
institutional change in general. Key determinants of institutional change in the 
literature are: 
i) External and internal events and dynamics in the political 
economy (Thelen and Hall 2009); 
ii) The nature of conflicts, material interests and power relations 
(Knight 1992, Streeck and Thelen, 2005) ; 
iii) The relative power of various actors to organize coalitions to 
defend or change existing institutional arrangements (Hall 
2009); 
iv) Shared storylines and the coalitions’ ability to dominate a 
political discourse (Leifeld Haunss 2011, Hajer 1995); and 
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v) Shared ideas, identities and common knowledge creation 
(Wendt 1999, Culpepper 2008). 
 
Much of the research literature focuses on explaining why institutions do not 
actually change. Authors refer to institutional inertia, path-dependencies and 
stickiness (Mahoney and Thelen 2009). Therefore, most analysis of institutional 
change also starts with analyzing institutional stability and the shocks that do 
cause institutional change. The most frequent explanations for institutional 
change are external events or “critical junctures”. Events exogenous to an 
institutional equilibrium are a common explanation for institutional change in 
sociological institutionalism research, as well as in some rational choice and 
neoclassical economic research on institutions (Weingast 2002, Katznelson 2003). 
The idea is essentially that institutional change is a disruption of an existing 
equilibrium by an external influence. An institution, here viewed as a 
coordinating mechanism for cooperation of competing rational actors, only 
emerges from a punctuated equilibrium (Baumgartner 2013).  
Historical institutionalism, in contrast, suggests that institutional change is 
often more nuanced, and emerges from a combination of exogenous and 
endogenous influences. Endogenous influences are changes in the political 
economy, which can emerge from small, seemingly insignificant behavioral 
changes or ideas of actors (Mahoney and Thelen 2009). The evolutionary 
perspective on institutional change suggests that institutional change is mostly 
incremental, as opposed to radical, and continuous as opposed to static (Ostrom 
and Basurto 2010). Endogenous institutional change can take different shapes, 
which have been conceptualized as types of institutional change as follows:  
i) Displacement refers to the replacement of existing rules 
through new rules;  
ii) Layering refers to the introduction of new rules along 
existing rules;  
iii) Drift refers to the changing impact of existing rules caused 
by a changing socio-economic environment, in the absence 
of new rules; and 
iv) Conversion refers to the changing performance of existing 
rules caused by strategic redeployment (Mahoney and 
Thelen, 2009, Streeck and Thelen 2005).  
 
Layering and displacement describe species of institutional change that produces 
new rules. Only under displacement are old rules are removed. Conversion and 
drift refer to changing impacts of existing rules, rather than the introduction of 
new rules. The outcome of institutional change depends on the composition of 
the actors involved in the coalitions for or against a policy intervention.  
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2.4 Conflicts, coalitions and power relationships in institutional change  
 
The nature of the coalitions and the actors drawn to a particular coalition 
depends on the distributional conflicts that a rule or policy creates. An actor will 
join the coalition that represents her interests and beliefs, and will aim to gain the 
benefits or to mitigate any losses that a policy intervention may result in. 
Distributional conflict stands at the center of explanations of institutional change 
from political economics, sociology and some rational choice scholars, which 
recognize distributional conflicts as central to policy processes (Knight 1992). 
These processes result from short-term, direct interests in the benefits of certain 
actors and indirect, longer term interests in the public good (Knight 1992, North 
1994). New conflicts can occur during the negotiation processes. These can be 
conflicts about clashing interests within government, resulting in trade-offs 
between those incompatible conflicts, as well as conflicts about the process and 
organization of collective actors. The negotiating power of the government bodies 
as well as that of the interest groups derives directly from their ability to organize 
themselves and to coordinate their interests (Knight 1992). 
Lacking the ability to explain power as one of the drivers of institutional 
change is recognized as a weakness of neoclassical explanations (North 1990, 
Teng 2012). Power distributional approaches to institutional change focus on the 
endogenous drivers of institutional change, which emphasize power. There is 
nothing automatic or predictable about these processes. Few rational choice 
approaches also emphasize power relationships as variables for institutional 
change (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). Conflict-driven approaches explain these 
drivers through conflicting interests and power relationships. Conflicts emerge 
from discontent and disadvantages felt by different interest groups. Advantaged 
groups may fear losing their privileges. Institutional change largely depends on 
the relative power of the political actors involved in the conflict and their ability 
to organize coalitions to defend or change existing institutional arrangements 
(Hall 2009). Power is a concept with multiple facets.  Firstly, power is a relational 
concept. Power only exists in a relationship between more than one individual 
and cannot exist in isolation. There are three relational conditions for a power 
relationship: i) power only exists if there is a conflict of interests or values 
between two or more parties; ii) a power relationship comes into existence when 
one party concedes to another party’s wishes; and iii) one of the parties must be 
able to sanction the other party (Bachrach and Baratz 1976). Secondly, power 
relates to assets and capabilities. Important power assets include access to 
financial, military and knowledge resources. Capability assets include the  ability 
to self-organize and to express political claims (Knight 1992).  
Coalitions emerge from a conflict of interest and values over a policy 
proposal. Each coalition attracts actors who share a set of basic beliefs that 
include policy goals plus causal and other perceptions and who seek to 
manipulate the rules (Sabatier 1991). The actors have different power assets, 
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authority, influence and even force, which may change over time (Bachrach and 
Baratz 1976). Research on the role of coalitions in driving institutional and policy 
change puts interest, ideas and belief systems at the center. Empirically, it can be 
difficult to establish the evidence for these interests and ideas. Hajer’s approach to 
discourse coalitions offers a solution to this problem in focusing on “shared 
storylines as the cement of the coalition”. Hajer (1995) puts language at the center 
of the analysis of coalitions which drive institutional change (or in his words 
“social change”). The focus on storylines is grounded in classical discourse 
analysis, which reflects the ideas and interests of the actors. Yet, discourse offers 
the opportunity to shape ideas and interests in the process of coalition building. 
An actor’s interest in a policy and her motivation for engaging in a coalition in 
support or opposition to that policy may differ from the argument that she puts 
forth to achieve her interests. Ideas may also change through participating in the 
public debate of a policy (Hajer 1995).  
Hajer’s discourse-centered perspective on the role of discourse coalitions 
in institutional change criticizes the current model in which government sets an 
agenda and society reacts to the proposals. He calls for increasing institutional 
reflexivity with more room for debate, because of the important of discourse in 
shaping coalitions and their interests and ideas (Hajer 1995). 
2.5 An analytical framework for institutional change  
 
The analytical framework used for this paper summarises the various factors that 
explain institutional change in the research literature. It draws on the main 
elements of the theories explaning institutional and policy change from the 
context of historical institutionalism (Streeck and Thelen 2005, Mahoney and 
Thelen 2009), discourse coalitions (Hajer 1993) and advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 
1988, Sabatier and Weible 2007). The table below lists the main elements that 
explains institutional change and shows how the frameworks complement each 
other.  
Table 1: Determinants in actor centred theories of change from historical institutionalism, 
discourse coalitions  and the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) 
Determinants  Historical 
institutionalism 
Discourse 
coalitions ACF  
Role of policy networks   ✔  
Role of ideas, beliefs and interests ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Long-term perspective (10 years +) ✔  ✔ 
Role of conflicts ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Role of coalitions   ✔ ✔ 
Role of international events  ✔  ✔ 
Political economy context  ✔  ✔ 
Power relations  ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Differentiation of institutional change  ✔   
Differentiation of the role of actors in 
determining institutional change  ✔   
        Source: own compilation  
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The framework illustrated below integrates the main determinants of institutional 
change which we identified in the research literature in this section. The 
framework will guide the analysis in the next section. Itestablishes the 
relationships between three main elements that determine institutional change:  
i) the wider political economic context, which shapes the 
ideas, interests and power relations that guide the behavior 
of domestic and international actors, as well as the 
composition of coalitions which drive or hinder institutional 
change in formal and informal negotiation processes;  
ii) the trade-offs and distributional conflicts that determine the 
coalitions depending on power relationships and potential 
losses and gains from a policy intervention; and  
iii) the nature of institutional change that emerges from the 
conflicts, power relations, coalitions and their formal and 
informal negotiation processes.  
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3 Methodology & Research design  
 
The operationalization of the theoretical framework requires a mix of methods. 
The methodology for this inquiry combines classic qualitative content analysis of 
interview data and documents with a discourse network analysis (DNA) based on 
statements from documents. The documents that went into the DNA dataset 
came from online searches through Lexis Nexis® and the Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group. The table below shows how each determinant of institutional 
change identified in the literature review of the previous section can be analysed. 
Power relationships between actors could not be fully assessed, as a 
comprehensive interview strategy covering all relevant actors was not successful, 
due to lack of availability of actors. The pilot interviews revealed valuable 
information, but not always the consolidated position of the organization the 
interviewed individual was associated with. For this reason, the author decided to 
change to a discourse network analysis based on official statements from the 
organizations, official comments to the public policy debate, statements in the 
media and from parliament, This resulted in a more reliable method to examine 
the discourse that shapes coalitions in support or opposition of specific climate 
policies.  
 
Table 2: Overview of methodology to assess institutional change 
 
Determinants of institutional change Methodological approach 
1 External and internal events and dynamics in the 
political economy (Thelen and Hall 2009) 
Qualitative analysis of political 
economy factors 
2 The nature of conflicts, material interests and power 
assets (Knight 1992, Streeck and Thelen, 2005)  
Qualitative analysis based on the 
interview strategy and documents 
3 The relative power of various actors to organize 
coalitions to defend or change existing institutional 
arrangements (Hall 2009) 
Not fully established, due to lack 
of availability of interviews to 
establish a coherent social 
network analysis 
4 Shared storylines and the coalitions’ ability to 
dominate a political discourse (Leifeld and Haunss 
2011, Hajer 1995) 
Discourse network analysis 
5 Shared ideas, identities and common knowledge 
creation (Wendt 1999, Culpepper 2008) 
Discourse network analysis and 
qualitative analysis  
 
The determinants of institutional change will guide the analysis of the three main 
climate policies in South Africa. We chose the National Response White Paper 
on Climate Change (NRCC), the Carbon Tax and the Renewable Energy 
Independent Power Producer Procurement Program (REIPPPP). These policies 
are currently the most relevant and most debated climate change mitigation 
interventions in the country. Others exist, such as the energy efficiency program, 
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but are less visible and less controversial. Comparing these three policies works in 
a most relevant case study design, but also from a most similar design perspective. 
All three policies started at similar times, with slightly different but similar sets of 
actors under similar political economic circumstances. The outcomes differ. Both 
the implementation of the carbon tax and the carbon budgets were postponed, 
while the Renewable Energy program has become a significant success story for 
the country’s energy policy. The different outcomes of the case studies re-focuses 
the research questions onto the issue of why institutional change happened in the 
case of renewable energy but the carbon tax and carbon budgets were postponed. 
How can trade-offs, distributional conflicts and their role of shaping coalitions 
explain these different outcomes? 
4 Analysis: Institutional change in South African climate policy 
 
This section analyses the institutional change and discourse coalitions in South 
Africa’s climate governance, by examining the dynamics and events that shape 
the conflicts between climate change mitigation and poverty reduction in the 
economic context.   
4.1 Dynamics and events in South Africa’s political economy of climate 
change mitigation and poverty reduction 
 
This sub-section provides an overview of the global and domestic dynamics and 
events that shape the structures in the South African political economy, and 
particularly those which drive conflicts and coalitions in support of or opposition 
to climate change and poverty reduction policy changes.   
Structural dynamics shaping South Africa’s political economy with respect to climate 
change mitigation and poverty reduction 
 
South African economic activity is largely fossil fuelled; these fuels account for 
ninety percent of its primary energy consumption. Coal remains an essential 
ingredient of South Africa’s economy and a significant earner of export revenues 
(Eberhard 2014). The electricity sector shows an equally high dependence on coal 
(DoE, 2010). Only ten percent of South Africa’s electricity comes from renewable 
and nuclear energy sources. Historically, the extractive industries laid the 
foundations for economic development over the past century (Sorensen 2015). 
The socio-economic structures and institutions that evolved from this 
development path continue to shape today’s political economy. Scholars 
conceptualized the close link between private capital and the state in the mining 
sectors, the electricity generator Eskom and the energy intensive industries as a 
“minerals energy complex’ (MEC) (Fine and Rustomjee 1996). The MEC 
describes a particular system of accumulation that has grown out of 
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predominantly English and Afrikaans mining interests and their political 
establishment. The system has largely sustained itself during the post-apartheid 
years through these historically grown institutional structures and a regulatory 
vacuum for the mining sectors. The expansion of financial markets favoured the 
integration of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) through access to the 
financial system (Fine 2008).  
 The MEC favours the consumption of fossil fuels and coal-generated 
electricity. Historically, Eskom subcontracted inexpensive low-grade coal from 
the mines and provided electricity at low rates to the mines and related industries 
in return. High electricity intensities result from these historically nurtured 
institutional structures, which result in  the unfortunate profile of a country with a 
relatively low middle income GDP and the emissions level of an industrialized 
nation.  
 Some of these historical structures have changed, in response to  changing 
international demand and coal prices. Eskom has more recently struggled to 
secure contracts for low-grade coal, due to competition mainly from Indian 
buyers (Burton and Winkler 2014, Eberhard 2014). 
Historically low electricity tariffs have more than doubled over the past 
five years. As many industrial users negotiated fixed tariffs over twenty year 
periods directly with Eskom, tariff increases do not necessarily affect them. 
Eskom’s generation costs exceed these tariffs; especially in times of crisis, which 
led to the use of diesel imports in 2014 and 2015. Production costs spiked as high 
as 4 ZAR per kwh, while some large consumers negotiated tariffs as low as 0,5 
cents per kwh (MacDonald 2009). This discrepancy is another threat to Eskom’s 
financial sustainability, which is already under stress as the utility sells electricity 
to municipalities who are sometimes  unable to pay for it. In some municipalities 
the income from electricity sales to residents is as high  as 70% of total revenue. 
The high dependency of municipalities on the revenue from electricity sales to its 
residents prevents them from creating financially viable incentives for residential 
use renewable energy and energy efficiency measures. Politically, Eskom is 
unable to disconnect defaulting municipalities from its electricity supply, as 
compromises in “service delivery” of basic infrastructure may lead to a loss of 
votes for the ANC ruling party.  
Although poverty levels have declined in South Africa since the end of 
apartheid, high income inequalities persist. Poverty levels are particularly high 
among the black African population. 80% of South Africans are black, and 93% 
of themcount as poor (Leibrandt et al 2014), while the white population make up 
9% of the total and hold about 41% of the country’s wealth (M&G 2011). 
Statistically, inequalities between racial groups have increased since the end of 
apartheid in 1994, while inequality between racial groups has decreased.2 The per 
                                               
2 Per capita income in total values remained grew seventeen percent, while white income grew 
twenty percent in the same period (SALDRU 1993, 2008). 
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capita income of a black African household member is a fraction of a tenth of the 
one in a white household (Leibrandt et al 2012).  
 The labour market continues to fuel inequalities between and within racial 
groups, as it largely allows only  skilled workers to move up and unlock higher 
earnings. Child support and old age grants have helped provide for lower income 
groups, but those without access to social grants or sufficient education to enter 
the labour market remain in poverty (Leibrandt et al 2012).  
 
These structural characteristics put South Africa’s electricity sector at the centre 
of the political economy of climate change mitigation and poverty reduction. The 
historically white dominated minerals energy complex reflects these inequalities, 
as “the Mineral Energy Complex (MEC) lies at the core of the South African 
economy not only by virtue of its weight in economic activity but also through its 
determining role throughout the rest of the economy” according to Rustomjee 
and Fine (1996). South African scholars have updated and expanded the concept 
of the MEC, arguing that it explains and sustains the inequalities in access and 
consumption of electricity in Africa. While 80% of the population remain 
undersupplied, mining and heavy industries consume the bulk of the available 
electricity at inexpensive rates (MacDonald 2009). 
 The tariff structure is designed to cross-subsidize between the poor and the 
wealthy. A free basic tariff provides an allowance for residents in poor areas. An 
inclining block tariff design charges high residential consumers higher tariffs, 
while those who consume less also remain in a cheaper tariff structure. This cross-
subsidy mainly applies to the residential sector, while industrial consumers pay 
about half of the average residential tariff.  
  The contribution of the electricity consumption from the poor population 
in South Africa to its emissions burden is small and likely to remain small (Tait 
and Winkler 2012). The negligible impact from electricity consumption from poor 
population groups on emissions may allow climate change mitigation and 
poverty to appear unrelated.   
Domestic and global events  
 
The electricity sector has also been affected by the current political crisis and vice 
versa. The mid-term future of the country’s electricity mix underwent a 
participative planning exercise, which resulted in the Integrated Resource Plan 
(IRP) (RSA 2011). The plan foresaw an energy mix of coal, nuclear and 
significant share of renewable energy to be implemented by 2030. The plan was 
intended to be updated every two years The DoE did update the plan, but did not 
present the updated version to parliament for approval (DoE 2013). The updated 
plan revised the economic growth prospects, expanded the planning horizon to 
2050, and delayed the decision on the nuclear build program, which had 
meanwhile emerged as  a presidential priority program (Rennkamp and Bhuyan 
2016).  Similarly, decision-making in the renewable energy sectors has been 
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erratic, as the future market size remains unclear and the program has expanded, 
with occasional increases in capacity, without a clear pathway forward (Baker 
2014). The nuclear program has become a cause of friction within the ANC. 
Minister of Finance Nhlanhla Nene repeatedly questioned the affordability of the 
nuclear program, along with other presidential initiatives, and was abruptly 
dismissed in December 2015. The immediate reaction from rating agencies and 
financial markets led Zuma’s advisors to reappoint the previous minister of 
finance Pravin Gordhan to restore trust at the financial markets. Gordhan 
committed to only funding projects within the scope of the national budgets 
(England 2015).  
 While the renewable energy program moved forward, the construction of 
new coal fired plants was delayed. The South African coal plants had seen no 
infrastructure investment since the 1970s. During the power crisis in 2014 and 
2015, former president Thabo Mbeki specifically apologized for this mistake 
made during his presidency. The electricity sector crisis in 2014 resulted from 
Eskom’s structurally unsustainable business model, failed reform attempts, lack of 
investment capacity and other factors (Eberhard 2008, Baker et al 2014). Eskom’s 
ability to raise capital in the international financial markets has declined visibly 
over the past years, which also made nuclear investments infeasible in 2008. The 
recent investments into new coal power plants were supported through a loan 
from the World Bank. The international financial crisis created opportunities, and 
pushed the renewable energy industry in Europe and the US increasingly into 
diversifying their markets and seeking opportunities in emerging economies.  
The international climate change negotiation and the South African 
commitment to hosting the 17th Conference of the Parties (COP) in Durban 
opened several windows of opportunity for domestic climate action. The carbon 
tax proposal, the renewable energy program and the climate change white paper, 
which are the main mitigation policies, all emerged either before or soon after the 
Conference. The policy processes were under way long before the COP, but as we 
will see in more detail below, the event created opportunities for all three policies 
for implementation through international performance pressure. 
The following analysis of the coalitions in support and opposition of South 
Africa’s main climate change mitigation policies will reveal the structure of public 
support for all interventions. The support structures will then show whether these 
policies can contribute to the necessary redistribution of emissions budgets and 
wealth in the country.  
4.2 South Africa’s climate change mitigation policy  
The South African government officially recognized the challenge of climate 
change mitigation and the science of the 4th assessment report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2009. President Jacob 
Zuma announced voluntary pledges for emissions reductions of 34% and 42% by 
2025 and 2030 respectively from a business as usual line at the 15th COP in 
Copenhagen in 2009.  
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 2011 was an important year for South African climate and energy policy. 
South Africa’s hosting of COP 17 put the country in the international spotlight. 
The cabinet approved the country’s first explicit climate policy, the National 
Climate Change Response White Paper (NCCR) in October, a month ahead of 
the COP. A month after the Conference, the Treasury and the Department of 
Energy launched the renewable energy independent power producer procurement 
program (REIPPP). The REIPPP is a competitive bidding program that aims to 
procure 7,3 GW of energy, derived from photovoltaic and concentrated solar, 
wind, small hydro and biogas sources, from independent power producers (IPP). 
Eskom issues power purchase agreements (PPAs) to buy and distribute the power 
generated from these producers. This program is significant, not only because it 
allows renewable energy to enter the electricity mix but also because it  creates 
competition between independent producers and has diversified the market for 
electricity generation. Eskom’s monopoly was technically reduced to the 
distribution function. The program replaced the feed in tariff (REFIT), which the 
National Energy Regulator (NERSA) had unsuccessfully tried to implement since 
2009. Furthermore, Cabinet gazetted an important planning document for the 
electricity sector, namely the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) earlier in 2011. As 
described above, the  IRP laid important foundations for the introduction  of 
renewable energy into the technology mix for electricity generation (RSA 2011). 
 The NCCR White Paper suggests a profile for greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions in the form of a “peak, plateau and decline trajectory” as a benchmark 
for mitigation. According to this profile, emissions will peak in the period from 
2020-2025 in the range of 398 mt to 614 mt of CO2 and plateau for up to ten years 
at similar levels. The policy aims to begin  reducing emissions only from 2036 
onwards. The target range, following reductions, is between 212 and 428 mt CO2 
(RSA 2011).  
Figure 2: South Africa’s proposed greenhouse gas emission trajectory 
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These numbers only become meaningful if they relate to the current emissions 
output. Total emissions from energy production alone in 2010 amounted to 492,2 
mt. 60% or 298,6 mt of these emissions emerge from electricity generation only 
(DEA 2013). The coal fired plants under construction, Medupi and Kusile, will 
add to the coal related emission for at least fifty years (Eskom 2011). Eskom and 
Sasol’s emissions alone add up to 300 mt per annum, with 230 and 72 mt 
respectively.  
 These emissions data show that effective climate change mitigation 
requires a transformation of historically developed structures of carbon 
combustion for fuel and electricity generation. The White Paper targets the 
electricity sector in suggesting renewable energy, energy efficiency programs and 
carbon pricing mechanisms as the main instruments for achieving emissions 
reductions. The implementation of these programs depends on the Department of 
Energy (DoE) and the support of other powerful entities in the government. The 
mandate for electricity planning falls under the DoE, while the much smaller 
Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) deals with climate change and 
initiated the White Paper process. The implementation of the renewable energy 
program showed that this support is essential.  
Understanding the penetration of renewable energy in the South African 
electricity mix requires a structural grasp of the political economy, supplementary  
legislation and sectoral planning. The main rationale for diversifying electricity 
generation technologies in the past were energy security concerns rather than 
climate change concerns. Electricity supply was interrupted significantly in 2008, 
because of generation capacity, and because coal supply did not keep up with the 
pace of economic development in the early 2000s. The initial IRP process 
organized technology choices and the way electricity supply should be secured 
until 2030 (later extended to 2050). The plan took economic development 
demands into account and suggested that it would be necessary to double the 
current capacity of 40 GW to roughly 80 GW by 2030. The process involved 
stakeholder participation, which allowed for active revision of the plan, and 
pushed the projected renewable energy capacity up to 17,3 GW, a total 
contribution of over 40% of the new added capacity of 40 GW by 2030.  
Another main component of the electricity sector reform is the 
Independent System Market Operator (ISMO) Bill, which was a proposal to split 
the Eskom’s single buyer monopoly into two state owned entities and allow the 
entry of independent power producers into the market. The ISMO bill was 
drafted in 2010 and was intended to be approved by the cabinet in 2011. The 
process was finally abandoned in 2015. The ISMO bill would have laid a legal 
basis for independent power producers beyond the REIPPP. 
There are no direct governmental programs targeting renewable energy to 
produce electricity for low income households. A solar water heating program is 
the main energy efficiency program targeted at poor households. A number of 
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pro-poor programs in the electricity sector aim to reduce electricity expenses in 
poor households, including the use of cross-subsidies, whereby large consumers 
are charged more for the benefit of poor consumers. Four subsidies benefit poor 
households: i) the state subsidy for network capital cost; ii) low connection fee; 
iii) low tariff structure at low consumption levels with gradually reducing cross-
subsidies as the consumption level increases; ” and iv) a “free basic electricity” 
scheme which is an allowance of up to 50kwh per month per household to cover 
basic needs, like light, water heating, ironing and basic media access.  
Besides clean electricity technologies, the White Paper suggested carbon-
pricing mechanisms as additional efforts for mitigation. Carbon pricing as a 
mitigation effort in the White Paper builds on the National Treasury’s 
“framework for considering market-based instruments to support environmental 
fiscal reform in South Africa” (NT 2006). This policy paper built a base for 
market signals to trigger environmentally friendly behaviour and consumer 
patterns. The Treasury introduced an electricity levy on industry tariffs to 
subsidize renewable energy and energy efficient light bulbs, a motor vehicle 
emissions tax, a price on plastic bags and tax incentives for investments in 
renewable energy investments. In 2010, the Treasury published a paper on a 
carbon tax option for comment. The tax was officially announced in 2012.  
Table 3: Implementation status of selected climate and energy policies in South Africa  
Policy Legal status Process Implementation 
National Climate 
Change White Paper  
(NCCR) 
White Paper Cabinet approval in 2011 Under delayed 
implementation 
Carbon Tax Policy papers, 
announced in various 
budget speeches 
Conceptualized in 2006, 
policy paper in 2010, 
announced in 2010, 








program based on 
the Electricity 
Regulation Act 
Initially suggested as 
REFIT in 2009, 
announced in 2011 
Under 
implementation, 




Government gazette IRP Update no approval Under 
implementation 
Independent System 
and Market Operator 
(ISMO) 
Draft Bill Announced in 2010, draft 
bill in 2011, delayed until 
2013, abandoned in 2015 
Not 
implemented 
Source: own compilation 
4.3 The National Climate Change Response White Paper  
 
The NRCC White Paper is South Africa’s only explicit climate policy. Parliament 
approved the White Paper on 19 October 2011, following five years of 
  21 
development including public and key stakeholder engagements, research and 
parliamentary hearings. The White Paper is a wide-ranging plan that tackles all 
aspects of climate change, including mitigation, adaptation, technology and 
finance. The mitigation section refers to a number of flagship projects in 
renewable energy and energy efficiency as well as carbon pricing mechanisms 
that should bring about the desired emissions reductions (RSA 2011). Many of 
these interventions are not under the mandate of the DEA, which makes the 
implementation of the plan subject to successful coordination with other 
departments. The following section disentangles the main controversies in the 
climate white paper. Sections 1.4 and 1.5 below will analyse the discourse 
networks for the carbon tax and renewable energy in detail.  
Conflicts, coalitions and power relations  
 
The White Paper polarized South Africa’s interest groups into two coalitions; 
namely those in opposition and those in support. The division was not with 
respect to the overall policy, but over specific aspects in the policy, which are 
summarized in Table 4 below. The most polarizing issue in the White Paper was 
the carbon budgets approach and its alignment to the carbon tax. The DEA 
suggested developing “carbon budgets” in the form of emissions contingents for 
each sector in the economy. Emissions in excess of these budgets would then be 
subject to pricing and taxation (RSA 2011).  
The network on the discourse coalitions as shown below clearly illustrates 
that carbon budgets and taxation stand at the centre of the debate. The approach 
to carbon budgets appealed to the DEA, because it seemed to be a 
“straightforward” approach.3 The idea was to work out benchmarks for emissions 
reductions called “desired emissions reductions outcomes” (DEROs), which 
divide the national carbon budget into sectorial budgets and later company-
specific budgets. Some companies were supposed to get specific budgets, others a 
mix of measures. The system was primarily intended to regulate the big emitters4.  
The network below illustrates the relationships of the coalitions favoring 
and opposing the White Paper, based on their comments in the public 
consultation process. The powerful coalition of the main emitters voiced their 
objections to the policy actively in the stakeholder engagement (PMG Notes). 
The main objections to the White Paper are the carbon budget and tax 
approaches, as well as their possibly negative impacts on economic 
competitiveness and jobs. The coalition of opponents to the White Paper are 
notably big emitters, including Sasol at the centre, the Business Unit South Africa 
(BUSA), the Industry Task Team on Climate Change and the Energy Intensive 
User Group.  In Figure 3 below, the opposition coalition actors in white circles 
are connected through red lines with the arguments they share. These arguments 
                                               
3 Interview Representative of the Department of Environmental Affairs. 
4 Interviews Representatives DEA, EUIG, ERC 
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are represented by blue squares. The green lines represent linkages between 
supporting coalition actors and the arguments they share. 
Figure 2: Discourse Network National Climate Change Response Policy 
 
 
Table 4: Main controversies in the NCCR White Paper  
Main arguments in favour of the 
NCCR 
Main controversies in the NCCR 
Existence of a climate change policy in 
principle. 
Carbon budgets  
Job creation 
Economic competitiveness 
Alignment of policies 
International support 
Carbon capture and storage 
 
The coalition of civil society groups welcomed the carbon budget’s approaches as 
a significant improvement over the previous Green Paper, although concerns 
arose that the specific targets were too vague and based on outdated data. Sasol, 
  23 
on the other hand, expressed an opposing view that it preferred aspirational 
targets subject to conditions, as structured in the Green Paper. Government held 
a similar view to other groups that the specific targets were necessary for success 
in combating climate change. There was consensus that more detail needs to be 
added to the structure of the budgets such as implementation and monitoring 
strategies.5 
The issue of carbon budgets also raised concerns around policy alignment, 
such as its co-existence with the carbon tax, the NCCR White Paper, Integrated 
Resource Plan 2010, beneficiation policy, economic development, and the new 
growth path. On this issue, the government emphasized that the NCCR White 
Paper is the umbrella policy framework and each executing department would 
have to align other policies with its broader objectives.  
The emissions trajectory informing the carbon budgets was also a focus of 
the debate. The Long Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS) informed the emissions 
trajectories that lead to the peak, plateau and decline scenarios in the White 
Paper. At the time, this was framed as “just a scenario planning process”.6 
However,  these numbers then actually informed the first national mitigation 
policy in the form of the White Paper, which made the business actors feel 
outmanoeuvred by the government.7 The peak-plateau-decline scenario emerged 
from the international “required by science” (RBS) scenario. The RBS shows the 
emissions trajectory if emissions were low enough to meet the target to maintain 
the temperature increase below two degrees.  
The first reaction against the peak-plateau-decline scenario in the White 
Paper was to critique the database for the LTMS. Business asked McKinsey to 
produce a presentation that raised the weak spots of the LTMS (McKinsey 2011). 
In a spirit of collaboration and an effort to arrive at conclusions by consensus, the 
DEA subcontracted  a mitigation potential analysis to develop economy-wide 
benchmarks for emissions reduction. The results were intended to be Desired 
Emissions Reduction Outcomes (DEROs), but the subjective value of the word 
“desired” as opposed to “technically feasible”  was problematic and  turned 
DEROs into a political rather than a technical problem.  
Another problem for the implementation of DEROs and carbon budgets 
was the database. There was no baseline. Attempts by the DEA and the Treasury 
to conduct studies that would establish a baseline that could inform the carbon 
budgets were blocked by the Business Unit. Companies were asked not to 
participate, and most complied.  
 
As a result the minister postponed the implementation of the carbon budgets for 
five years (source Edna Molewa), and instead  efforts were concentrated on the 
design of the carbon tax, which has however suffered from a similar delay in its 
                                               
5 Interview Network Data based on Public Comments on NCCRWP 
6 Interview, ERC representative  
7 Interview NBI representative 
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implementation. In the next phase, from 2021-2025, the DEA will attempt to 
establish a  legal basis for emissions reporting, but this will likely prove difficult in 
light of the strong established opposition. The dilemmas were postponed without 
any obvious solutions. The implementation of the measuring, reporting and 
verification system for emissions reduction also remains unresolved, because 
there is no legal basis for verification (PMG source). 
 
External influences 
Both national and international drivers motivated the White Paper. The paper 
turned the country’s pledges for emissions reductions into national policy and 
established its integrity ahead of COP17. South Africa's meeting its international 
obligations remains conditional upon it receiving the necessary finance, 
technology and other forms of support from the developed nations. 
The rush to finalize the White Paper in time for the COP resulted in its 
approval by cabinet before public hearings were held for input from stakeholders 
and only eight days were allowed for submission of public comments on the 
policy. The short timeframe raised concerns about the process and resulted in a 
policy that postponed a number of significant decisions. The coalition of 
supporters in the government, civil society and to some extent business welcomed 
a climate policy in principle. The process of turning the emissions reductions 
stated in the White Paper into an Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 
(INDC) followed during 2015. Actors in and outside the government who did not 
pay much attention to climate policy were alerted when the INDC proposal went 
for parliamentary approval. The format of the INDC relies very much on the 
content in the White Paper.  
Further international influences played a role in the implementation of the 
White paper. The German funded international climate initiative (IKI) 
contributed funding for capacity in the DEA climate change unit, which  now 
comprises around 23 staff. 8 
Institutional change   
The approval of the White Paper drove innovative institutional change towards 
the current first climate change framework, but the Paper remains a vague 
expression of intent. The implementation of  individual actions depends on 
different policies and departments, beyond the mandate of the Department of 
Environmental Affairs. DEA relied on the existing framework for air pollution 
and aimed to expand it for emissions reporting (source PMG), but  legislation for 
emissions reporting and air pollution is necessarily very different in practice. 
Sasol has been engaged in a court case opposing some aspects of air pollution 
legislation for years, and the opposition actors under BUSA made it clear that an 
attempt to expand  existing air pollution legislation  to also cover emissions 
reporting would result in another court case. The existing legal framework was 
                                               
8 PMG (2015) https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/21469/ 
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not robust enough to allow the DEA to move ahead, leaving them a choice 
between a legal battle or collaboration with the business association. The choice 
was collaboration. The group dropped the charges after the DEA granted Sasol a 
five year postponement on compliance with the Minimum Emission Standards. .9  
The vagueness of the White Paper provisions with respect to emissions reductions 
left room for different interpretations. The implementation was left for later, 
within two years of publication of the White Paper. Two years, however, proved 
very short for a thoughtful implementation of the budgets approach and its 
monitoring system. 
Here, institutional change here can be summarized as layering, because 
the framework rests on existing policies and brings in innovative elements. The 
launch of the White Paper was a strategic move to sustain South Africa’s 
credibility at the COP. The implementation of the paper was planned for 2013. 
Some initiatives under DEA’s mandate operated under this deadline. Other 
flagship programs like renewable energy and carbon pricing relied on the efforts 
of other government departments, which operate differently. Although the White 
Paper is an all government policy, interviewees often referred to “DEA’s White 
Paper”.10 
 The White Paper is South Africa’s first explicit climate policy. The 
implementation of its main mitigation programs depends on other negotiation 
processes, which all face similar resistance from a strong coalition of powerful 
actors incentivized to maintain the status quo.  
4.4 The carbon tax 
 
The carbon tax is currently South Africa’s most contested climate policy. The tax 
aims to charge corporate emitters at the rate of 120 ZAR/7.3EUR per ton. The 
tax was first announced in 2012, but is not yet implemented.  
Discourse coalitions in support and opposition of the carbon tax  
 
The carbon tax proposal has resulted in  two competing coalitions, namely those 
in support of and in opposition to the tax. 51 organizations have publicly stated 
their position in support or opposition, as illustrated in the network below in 
white circles. Actors in the coalition connected through green lines form the 
coalition of supporters, while actors connected in red lines represent the coalition 
of opponents. They are connected through the discourse they share arguing in 
favor or opposition of the tax proposal. The size of the circles and squares reflect 
the frequency of engagement measured in eigenvector centrality.11 
                                               
9  http://www.iol.co.za/scitech/science/environment/sasol-drops-air-pollution-court-challenge-
1851633 
10 DoE Representative at the National Climate Change Committee Meeting 
11 Eigenvector centrality is a centrality measure that highlights the centrality of a node in a 
network in respect to the centrality of other nodes in the network. 
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The structure of the coalitions is not surprising. The supporting coalition consists 
of government departments, trade unions, several NGOs, consulting and 
academic organizations. This coalition is relatively small, with 17 actors. The 
proponents of the carbon tax ally in a coalition of government departments. The 
National Treasury is the custodian of the carbon tax in the government. The 
DEA and the National Planning Commission support the proposal. Think tanks, 
universities and civil society support the tax, because of its contributions to 
fulfilling the government’s functions of providing (global) public goods in forms 
of cool climate and poverty reduction.  
The coalition of opponents consists mainly of those who stand to lose 
financially from the implementation of the carbon tax. Large polluters and their 
business organizations stand at the center of this coalition. Sasol, Eskom, the 
Energy Intensive User Group (EIUG), Business Unity of South Africa (BUSA) 
and the South African Chamber of Commerce and Industry are the strongest 
opponents to the carbon tax., Sasol (South African Synthetic Oil Limited) , 
produces petrol from coal to liquid technologies and is also South Africa’s third 
largest coal producer, contributing one third of the country’s total emissions.  
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 Sasol is the most central actors in the coalition of opponents, as the carbon 
tax directly threatens its coal-to-liquid operations. The group runs a climate 
change unit with seven full time staff members who dedicate their time to climate 
response strategies and engagement with the policy processes.12 A representative 
from Sasol’s climate change unit served on the South African delegation to the 
international climate change negotiations. Besides internal efforts, Sasol has 
organized its opposition through the business associations EIUG and BUSA. The 
EIUG represents 31 firms who consume about half of the country’s electricity. 
The companies operate mostly in mining and manufacturing and employ half a 
million people. The EIUG has four staff members who work with an Industry 
Task Team for Climate Change based at the mining company Glencore. BUSA 
represents a wider range of business and industries. However, BUSA’s 
engagement in the carbon tax is also driven through Sasol, as BUSA’s main 
representative in the carbon tax debate is simultaneously heading the Chemical 
and Allied Industry Association.  
Other opponents to the tax have joined the opposing coalition of powerful 
businesses, despite having lower or no financial stakes. Political parties, such as 
the Democratic Alliance may join this coalition primarily because of its position 
opposing the ruling party. Think tanks, universities and civil society organizations 
engage in the debates either to add knowledge or to represent marginalized 
groups who may be negatively affected by the tax, but lack the power resources to 
engage directly in the process. These organizations frame the public discourse 
around the tax rather than being directly affected through either benefits or losses 
of the tax. 
Power is distributed unevenly in these coalitions. The opposing coalition 
has more power resources in terms of number of actors in business, and the  
ability to self-organize of the business interest groups as well as their monetary 
and human resources. The proposing coalition’s main power asset is the 
legislative power exclusive to the government. Additionally, there are power 
relations and competition within government. The Treasury has a powerful13 
position within the cabinet, as do most Departments of Finance. The Treasury 
has the support of three departments. Other important departments like the 
Department of Trade and Industry have expressed their concerns about the 
benefit of the tax. Implementing the carbon tax is therefore important for the 
Treasury in order to maintain its power position within government and vis-à-vis 
the private sector.  
Both coalitions frame the problem as one of a trade-off between emissions 
reductions and poverty alleviation. The main difference is that the proposing 
coalition argues that this trade-off can be overcome: revenue transfer through tax 
collection can alleviate poverty, and green economy jobs can balance out possible 
job losses in the fossil fuel industry.  The main arguments of the coalition in 
                                               
12 Interview Sasol Representative (2014) 
13 Interviews: President EUIG 
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support are, firstly, the tax’s contribution to emissions reductions, and secondly, 
the possibility of revenue transfers to poor households.  
The coalition of opponents argues that the tax will compromise the 
companies’ competitiveness and limit economic activities and growth, and that it 
is not aligned with existing policies and levies. In their view, a carbon tax cannot 
achieve two objectives, and so cannot  reduce emissions and poverty at the same 
time. The reference to low-income households is less frequent than in the 
discourse of the proposing coalition. The opposition does argue  that the tax will 
lead to increases in  electricity tariffs, which will lead to a heavier burden on poor 
households. Eskom is very clear in its position that they will not pay the tax 
themselves, and that it will be passed on to consumers. Given its financial 
situation, this argument is very convincing. Passing on the carbon tax would 
affect every electricity consumer in the country. Behavioural changes to reduce 
this impact are not necessarily possible, because 95% of electricity users depend 
on the national grid. Consequently, tariff increases will affect almost everyone. 
This argument allows Eskom to elevate the carbon tax discourse to broader 
constituencies, and strengthens the opposing coalition. Eskom’s claim attracts 
civil society organizations to the opposition coalition in pursuit of their interests 
in defending poor households from additional cost burden. Simultaneously, the 
government and proposing coalition need to ensure, through further cross-
subsidies to electricity costs, that poor households do not suffer from the tax..  
The so called “recycling options”, which refers to the options of how the 
tax revenue can be spent, were narrowed down to either increasing cross-
subsidies for poor households to mitigate increases in household expenditure, or 
feeding the revenue back into the industry in form of energy efficiency measures 
(Treasury, 2014). 
In sum, the main arguments against the carbon tax are the prospects of job 
losses, negative impacts on the industry’s competitiveness and economic growth, 
and its alignment with other implicit carbon prices. Conversely, the coalition of 
supporters argues that the tax will contribute to emissions reductions and reduce 
residential electricity cost, which will lift the cost burden on poor households. The 
most contested issues are the impact of the tax on residential electricity cost, 
competitiveness, emissions reductions, jobs and alignment.   These arguments are 
summarized in Table 5 below. 
Table 5: Key arguments in favour of and against the carbon tax 
Main arguments for the carbon tax Main arguments against the carbon tax 
Emissions reductions Job losses  
Residential electricity cost through revenue 
transfers to poor households 
Negative impact on competitiveness 
International carbon pricing Negative impact on economic growth 
Behavioral changes through incentives to use 
cleaner fuel 
Policy alignment with current levies and 
existing carbon prices 
Job creation Compromise economic growth 
Source: own compilation based on discourse network analysis for South Africa’s carbon tax 
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External influences on the domestic debates on the carbon tax 
International actors and organizations have mainly had roles in diffusing norms 
and producing knowledge. Norm diffusion happens mainly through the 
UNFCCC and the IPCC. The South African government acknowledged the 
findings of the IPCC and the pledges to the UNFCCC for conditional emissions 
reductions in its National Response to Climate Change White Paper (see section 
3.5 in this paper). The domestic actors generally acknowledge the global problem 
and the necessity to reduce emissions in their official statements, the media and 
interviews. The most common response is “yes, but…” and the subsequent 
question as to how the burden and cost of emissions reductions can be supported. 
 The National Treasury referred to experiences in other countries who 
started to implement environmental taxes in the early 2000’s. These policies 
inspired the Treasury to also begin considering environmental taxation in 2004. 
The result was a first policy paper on environmental taxation in 2006. Policy 
learning occurred at a relatively high level and motivated South African policy 
makers to tackle a new policy domain, but did not lead to copying an exact tax 
design from another country. Collaborations with international organizations and 
academic bodies such as the OECD and UNU Wiser added to the knowledge 
production on the carbon tax and its possible impacts. A collaboration between 
experts from UNU Wiser, National Treasury staff and Southern African 
academics produced a small body of peer reviewed literature on economy-wide 
impacts of different tax levels and their impacts on income distribution. The 
OECD added a comparative study on carbon taxes in different countries 
including a study on South Africa to the literature. The World Bank also 
contributed  to the literature with comparisons between the 15 countries that have 
taxes in place. The role of these organizations in the national discourse is quite 
discrete, and  limited to the production of knowledge rather than putting any 
obvious pressure on government with respect to the tax proposal.  
 In terms of bilateral cooperation, the British High Commission funded a 
pilot emissions trading scheme in 2014 to prepare for the implementation of the 
tax in 2016 with the objective of aligning the tax with international emissions 
trading and pricing schemes. (Reuters from BD 18.7.2014) 
Implementing domestic carbon pricing because of potential international 
taxation is a frequent argument for the tax. Border tax adjustments aim to tax 
those who do not tax carbon intensive product domestically. A country without a 
national carbon-pricing regime would have to pay the difference on its carbon 
intensive exports and imports. Coal exports are a significant source of income to 
the South African GDP. Border tax adjustments could hit the mining sector hard, 
in the absence of a national carbon tax. In the absence of an internationally 
binding agreement for emissions reductions, however, this scenario seems to 
move further into the future and doesn’t come up as an immediate concern in the 
coalition that opposes the carbon tax. 
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Institutional change  
Institutional change in the market-based climate change policy is incremental. 
Since the environmental tax reform in 2006, the Treasury has succeeded in 
introducing small levies for renewable energy and fuel taxes. The carbon tax is a 
major policy change, which attracts strong opposition, because it may produce 
direct financial losses in industry actors that stand at the core of the country’s 
political economy. Organizations like the EUIG, Sasol, Eskom and BUSA who 
represent employers of almost a million people can argue against the tax by 
raising the spectre of job losses and decreased competitiveness in a political 
economy where the government’s main objective is job creation leading  to 
reduced poverty and inequality.  
Alignment with existing taxes and levies is an important argument against 
the tax and for improved tax design. The opposing coalition claims that lack of 
alignment with existing levies is a major shortcoming of the current tax design. At 
a glance, the tax seems an innovative instrument that fills a policy vacuum, 
because there is no explicit carbon pricing regime in place. A closer look at the 
existing environmental legislation reveals that the carbon tax builds on an existing 
regime of levies and implicit carbon prices. The tax builds on at least three 
implicit carbon prices. Firstly, an energy levy on non-renewable sources of 3 cents 
per kwh. Secondly, the inclining block tariff which charges lower tariffs to 
consumers of small amounts of electricity and higher tariffs to consumers of 
higher amounts, although corporate consumers negotiate their rates in separate 
processes. The block tariff and the free basic electricity policy are the main 
instruments for cross-subsidizing of electricity tariffs to low income households. 
Thirdly, in the transport sector a tax on the purchase of new vehicles that emit 
more than 120g/km of CO2 during operation, at a rate of R75 per g/km above 
120g/km, was introduced in 2010. The tax exempts minibus taxis, which are the 
main form of affordable public transport predominantly used by passengers in a 
lower income range.  
 The existing regime of carbon pricing constitutes another case of 
“layering” in institutional change, which is, as described above, the introduction 
of new rules on top or alongside existing rules according to Streeck and Thelen 
(2005).  
 
To date, the policy development process has been a mix of two rounds of formal 
public consultations with policy documents and comments submitted by the 
interested stakeholders. The feasibility of the carbon tax depends on the 
government’s ability to maneuver its proposal through the opposition’s sphere of 
interest without ending up with a toothless policy.  
Since the beginning of the carbon tax process, Treasury has already made 
a number of compromises. Firstly, research from UNU Wider and the Treasury 
initially  suggested levels of 30 Euros per ton in order to make an impact on 
emissions reductions (Arndt et al. 2011). In practice, the Treasury decided to 
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announce the tax at a third of this suggested rate (Treasury 2013). Secondly, 
informal negotiations between the Treasury and the main opponents of the tax 
led to sectoral exemptions. Thirdly, the date of implementation of the tax was 
postponed for one year to January 2016. Fourthly, the National Treasury 
published a policy paper on offsetting options, which allows affected parties of the 
carbon tax to offset their payments through various external renewable energy, 
energy efficiency, transport, agriculture or forestry projects (Treasury 2014). 
‘External’ in this context means that the project must be external to the company 
and outside of the dedicated government programs. The offsetting rules follow 
the international rules of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The 
Designated National Authority, which administers South Africa’s few CDM 
projects may administer the offsetting program. The offsetting options open an 
attractive loophole for businesses who wish to avoid additional tax payments. 
Furthermore, the offsetting program, if administered properly, may be an 
effective way of overcoming the trade-offs between emissions reductions and 
poverty reduction and actively create a win-win situation with an innovative 
institutional design, which builds on existing institutional arrangements and 
capacity.  
A neo-patrimonial outcome of institutional change is likely in the case of 
the carbon tax. This is a result of a combination of a formal policy process and 
informal negotiation processes between the most powerful actors. The most likely 
outcome is that the Treasury will implement a formal tax, but informally 
negotiated exemptions with respect to  the significant sectors will negate its 
impact on achieving the desired emissions reductions.  
 
4.5 Renewable energy in the electricity sector reform  
South Africa’s abundant resources for solar and wind energy make renewable 
energy a suitable alternative to fossil fuelled electricity supply. Despite its climatic 
advantages and available technology, it took fifteen years from the intention to 
increase the renewable energy share in the electricity mix in the National Energy 
White Paper in 1998 for renewable energy to actually enter the national grid. An 
unimplemented Renewable Energy White Paper in 2003, a draft  Feed-in Tariff in 
2009 and finally the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer 
Procurement Program in 2011 were landmarks on the legislative route towards 
implementing renewable energy. The integrated resource plan (IRP) legitimized 
the introduction of renewable energy into South Africa’s electricity mix for the 
future in 2010, but its revised update never reached parliamentary approval. A bill 
for a reform of the electricity sector to a market based system that allows an active 
role for independent power producers was finally dropped from the decision 
makers’ desks in 2015.  
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Why did it take so long to unlock South Africa’s renewable energy resources and 
translate them into active electricity generation capacity for the national grid? 
How did the players in the national political economy enable institutional change 
in the electricity sector on some occasions and hinder it in others? 
Table 6: Main renewable energy (RE)-related policies in South Africa’s electricity sector  
Policy Date Objective Status 
Energy white paper  1998 
Support implementation of RE 
technologies, attract investment in RE 




White paper  
2003 10 000 GWh (0.8 Mtoe) renewable 
energy contribution to final energy 
consumption by 2013, to be produced 





2010 9,6 GW of nuclear; 6,3 GW of coal; 
17,8 GW of renewables; and 8,9 GW 
of other generation sources.  
Parliamentary approval 
Integrated Resource 
Plan Update  
2013 Delay nuclear decision, amplify gas 
and continue procuring renewable 
energy with additional annual rounds 
of 1000 MW PV capacity; 1000 MW 
wind capacity and 200 MW CSP 
capacity, with the potential for hydro 
at competitive rates. 




Feed In Program 
(REFID) 








Procurement Program  
(REIPPPP) 
2011 6,9 GW in 5 bidding rounds of PV, 








Provide ISMO as a company 
responsible for the planning of supply 
of electricity […] to minimize electricity 
to customers 




The policies summarized in the table above were managed through quite different 
processes. The Energy White Paper, the Renewable Energy White Paper, the IRP 
and the REFID were all quite open policy processes, accompanied by public 
consultation and media coverage.  The White Papers and the IRP were mostly 
planning exercises, containing recommendations but no binding decisions. The 
non-binding nature of the IRP was underlined by calling it a “living document” 
that should be revised every two years. The REIPPP, the ISMO and the IRP 
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Update did not allow for public consultation.  The Department of Energy 
presented the IRP Update belatedly. The update came as a surprise to the public 
and even to government officials in other departments.14  
 Cumulatively, the seven policies in Table 6 form the institutional and 
legislative foundations for renewable energy in South Africa. The planning 
policies (White Papers and IRP) set forth long term intentions for an increase of 
renewable energy, while the ISMO, IRP Update and the REFID/REIPPPP 
suggest concrete actions and choices. These policies created actual conflicts, with 
winners and losers. For the analysis of institutional change in the renewable 
energy sector we do not focus on each individual policy, but on the public 
discourse in general. The following section will present the analysis of the 
conflicts and related discourse coalitions in the renewable energy sector.  
Conflicts, coalitions and power relations  
There are no evident trade-offs between renewable energy (in the form of climate 
friendly technologies) and poverty reduction in the debates on (renewable) energy 
policy. The discourse network doesn’t reveal any competing objectives between 
poverty reduction, job creation and other development objectives with the 
implementation of renewable energy programs. The main arguments for 
renewable energy in the discourse coalitions are in fact emissions reduction, 
industrial development and job creation. The nature of the conflict between the 
discourse coalitions is mostly distributional.  
  Arguments on the costs of renewable energy point to opportunity costs, 
assuming that adopting renewable energy may take away funding from rolling 
out other technologies. The competitive nature of the renewable energy program 
led to renewable energy prices falling far below the originally envisioned feed-in 
tariff. Wind energy prices dropped below the price of coal-fired energy in the third 
bidding round. Prices continue to be the subject of heated discussions in the 
public discourse, especially when it comes to coal or nuclear infrastructure.  
The distributional conflicts shape two coalitions, those for and against 
renewable energy, and these both compete for government support. The coalition 
against renewable energy involves Eskom and other interested parties in 
traditional large electricity infrastructure. The main arguments of the coalition 
against renewable energy are the power crisis, baseload and intermittency of 
renewable energy, cost and the existing commitment to fossil fuels.  
The proposing or supporting coalition again consists of government 
departments, numerous civil society organization and renewable energy industry 




                                               
14 Interview: Representatives Department of Environmental Affairs, National Treasury  
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Figure 5 Discourse coalitions proposing and opposing renewable energy in South Africa  
 
 
     
The commitment to a fossil fuelled electricity infrastructure and existing expertise 
in the country drives the opposing coalition to a position defending the status 
quo, which is very much in line with the concept of institutional inertia. Eskom’s 
expertise lies mostly in managing centralized energy infrastructure and building 
coal-fired power plants, if at any. The previous regime produced a now aging 
generation of nuclear engineers who support the nuclear energy program. The 
arguments for large, centralized power plants, whether coal or nuclear, unify 
under the argument of baseload. Baseload refers to the constant electricity 
generation provided by coal or nuclear, as opposed to intermittent electricity 
generation, which renewables suffer from in cases of lack of sunshine or wind. 
The fact that the baseload problem reduces with a growing amount of renewable 
energy sources has yet to enter the political discourse. Baseload remains 










Table 7: Overview of main arguments for and against renewable energy 
Main arguments for renewable energy Main arguments against renewable energy 
Emissions reductions  Commitment to fossil fuels  
Job creation  Rising cost of renewable energy  
Industrial development  Focus on cleaner coal 
Declining cost of renewable energy Policy uncertainty 
Renewable energy incentives Baseload 
     
One of the major problems with advancing renewable energy technology in South 
Africa is the institutional inertia that comes from the existing fossil fuel 
dependence and the lack of leading  renewable energy industries domestically.  
 The intergovernmental power relationships were an important 
determinant of institutional change favouring the implementation of renewable 
energy. NERSA, despite its mandate as an energy regulator was not able to 
secure the support of the more powerful departments as in energy, finance and 
the presidency.  
External influences on the electricity sector reform  
As mentioned above, the COP 17 in Durban imposed performance pressure on 
South Africa. President Jacob Zuma launched the South African Renewables 
Initiative (SARI) during the conference. The country’s renewable energy capacity 
at the time amounted to 3 MW in demonstration programs. Shortly after the 
announcement of SARI, the Treasury and the DoE launched the REIPPP 
program, which Zuma did not mention during the COP.  The announcement of 
the new program took the industry by surprise, as had the previous halt to 
NERSA’s feed-in tariff proposal. 15  The process of decision-making on the 
renewable energy procurement program corresponds to the concept of 
neopatrimonial decision-making which occurs in non-transparent processes, 
involving small elites, in this case government representatives and a few external 
mostly international consultants.  
 The renewable energy industry is mostly international. When South 
Africa’s program started in 2011, there were no significant solar or wind energy 
industries in the country. The program aimed to develop local industries through 
local content requirements, which force international manufacturers to invest into 
local manufacturing sites or buy from other local manufacturers. These 
                                               
15 Interview Representative: South African RE Industry Association 
  36 
requirements produced two tower manufacturers in the wind energy industry and 
a number of photovoltaic solar panel assemblies. However, the fact that the 
renewable energy industries are mostly foreign caused opposition to the program, 
arguing that government support should rather target existing local expertise and 
support the development of clean coal technologies and other “baseload” 
technologies. 
Institutional change  
The combination of international performance pressure for climate action and 
domestic pressure on the electricity grid drove institutional change in favour of 
the implementation of a renewable energy program, despite powerful opposition. 
Institutional change in the electricity sector has been underway since the late 
1990s. With its Energy White Paper, the ANC spelled out its vision for South 
Africa’s electricity future for the first time. Renewable energy received significant 
attention in the paper, but without formulating any specific targets. The Energy 
White paper was an expression of interest in renewable energy technology 
development, without any clear commitment. Parliamentary approval was 
simple, as the paper did not create any serious distributional conflicts. As 
economic growth picked up in the 2000s, South Africa’s development pathway 
appeared to be on the right track, until Eskom’s management crisis became 
evident with the power shortages in 2005-2008. The need to diversify the 
electricity supply became evident. NERSA began the process of designing a feed-
in tariff in 2007, based on its mandate in the National Electricity Regulation Act. 
When NERSA presented the REFIT in 2009, the Treasury vetoed the proposal, 
because it did not comply with procurement rules. The government changed the 
regulation from a price-based to a quantity-based competitive procurement 
program.  
The REIPPP deals with the reality of inequality and poverty in two ways: 
Socio-economic development criteria established very specific rules for local 
content requirements and community development criteria. Local content 
requirements are a common way of creating local industries and forcing 
international investment into the country through a trade barrier. The content 
rules require a specific percentage of the value of each plant to be sourced from 
local manufacturers. To date, the content rules have resulted in the two wind 
tower manufacturing plants and  solar photovoltaic assembly plants mentioned 
above.. The he value of these content rules remains highly contested between 
industry representative, project developers and the government (Rennkamp and 
Westin 2013). The community development rules require that developers spend a 
specific percentage of their investment in the power plant in benefit of local 
communities within a 50 km radius of the plant. The rules for the payment of 
these funds have been non-specific. The industry developed different models on 
how to fulfill these requirements through direct expenditure to the communities, 
funding non-profit organizations or a combination of both. It is too early to assess 
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the impact of the expenditure, but new institutional arrangements of industry-
community-government relations can already be identified (Wlokas 2015). 
  The renewable energy program contains elements of policy innovation. Its 
socio-economic development requirements are not just new to South Africa, but 
also new to the world. The overall successful implementation of the program 
became a major advantage for renewable energy technologies, despite the 
confusion surrounding the implementation of community development criteria 
and the heated debate on  local content requirements.  
Eskom’s management crisis blazed up again in 2014 and 2015. The crisis 
revealed that there are to be major electricity shortages in the years to come. The 
reasons for the crisis slowly came into focus. After a major silo collapsed in 2014, 
it became clear that Eskom’s management had neglected important maintenance 
work, while focusing too much on “keeping the lights on”. The slogan of 
“keeping the lights on” became the credo for Eskom corporate policy during the 
2010 FIFA World Cup, when international attention focused on South Africa.16 
The crisis led to a major conflict between the ministers of public works and 
energy, who held  diverging views of how to deal with the crisis. While the 
minister of public works supported the view that Eskom should roll out 
temporary power cuts and undertake the necessary maintenance work, the 
minister of energy called for “keeping the lights” on. During 2014 and 2015, 
Eskom bought diesel to produce electricity at a cost of 4 ZAR and could only sell 
it at a maximum of 3 ZAR. The budget crisis in the utility became more and more 
evident. The government had to organize emergency bailouts. Eventually, the 
minister of public works prevailed with her view on maintenance and load 
shedding. Electricity shortages and rolling blackouts have become part of day-to-
day life in South Africa. The crisis opened an opportunity for further electricity 
supply from renewable energy. The minister of energy announced an additional 
1,8 GW to be allocated in the program in an “expedited bid submission phase”. 
 The REIPPP is designed in a flexible way that allows the government not 
to commit to any longer term plan. The program only foresaw five bidding 
rounds and 3,7 GW of input. This allocation of renewable energy can then be 
increased if desired. The DoEapproved 79 renewable energy projects under the 
REIPPP until August 2015. The installed capacity amounts to 5 243MW and 
represents private investment of R168 billion. An additional 6300 MW of 
additional generation capacity are currently under consideration.  
There is no official communication on the program’s future after the 5th 
bidding round in 2016. The IPP unit, which manages the administration of the 
program, has no institutional basis. The lack of institutional sustainability of the 
program reflects the lack of long-term commitment in the decision-making 
process. This lack of commitment is also reflected in the flexibility built into the 
IRP.  
                                               
16 Former CEO Eskom at Seminar: “The Energy Challenge” at the University of Cape Town, 26th 
August, 2011 
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Overall, institutional change for renewable energy in the electricity can be 
summarized as layering. Multiple policies have been introduced in addition the 
existing ones. However, there are also elements of policy innovation which have 
not   been implemented before. Drivers of institutional change are a combination 
of both domestic electricity crises and need for diversified electricity supply as 
well as international performance pressure from the climate change negotiations 
and international industries. Barriers to institutional change remain the obstacles 
that result from the overall structure of the political economy. The lack of long-
term commitment reflects the pressures from industries that support competing 
technologies, and the government is keeping the options of further coal-fired 
plants and a major nuclear program open.  
The REIPPP creates a significant renewable infrastructure. Initially the 
program funded projects larger than 5 MW, but later it was opened to 1 MW 
projects. Net metering and residential grid connected use of renewable energy is 
still very limited. Only a few municipalities offer net metering possibilities against 
a connection fee that defeats the point of the exercise. The regulator NERSA 
started a process to increase the use of renewable energy technologies in the 
residential sector, but the constraints of the high dependence on revenue from 
electricity sales in the municipalities slowed the implementation of this process. 
Renewable energy is a potential win-win technology for poor households, 
especially for those that are not connected to the grid. The electrification 
program, however, envisions getting consumers on the grid rather than providing 
off-grid alternative technologies, for the above-mentioned reasons. The Free Basic 
Electricity Tariff and the Inclining Block Tariff aim to cross-subsidize electricity 
use and make it affordable for low-income households. Again, these policies 
operate under the premise that every household connects to the national grid. The 
current structure of the electricity market does not encourage the use of renewable 
energy technologies in low-income households. Any incentives towards 
decentralized electricity supply translate into perceived revenue losses, although 
additional capacity would relieve the stress on the grid.  
 
5 Conclusion  
The analysis used in this paper shows how the success and failure of institutional 
change depends on the interplay of distributional conflicts and power relations 
between the actors in the respective coalititons, as well as international norms. 
The distributional conflicts matter more than potential trade-offs; who wins and 
who loses from climate response policy determines respective coalitions in the 
policy development process. The case studies on the carbon tax and climate white 
paper showed how strong coalitions of the heavily emitting industries and 
proponents of centralized energy technologies successfully defend the status quo. 
The opposing coalitions are most active in situations where they fear actual 
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financial losses. The discourse networks on the carbon tax and the carbon budgets 
appear as the most controversial climate policy proposals, as they threaten the 
future operations of powerful corporations and possibly all electricity consumers. 
In the electricity sector, particularly in a country where so much of the population 
is poor, cost remains the most contested issue. Proponents of centralized energy 
technologies use the cost argument to advocate for  coal and nuclear power 
plants, as if the renewable energy program took public resources away from these 
programs. The overall success of the renewable energy program relied on the 
support of a large coalition of supporters in business, government, civil society 
and international actors. The program offered investment opportunities and 
created win-win situations. The carbon tax and carbon budgets proposal did not 
operate in a similarly favorable environment. Distributional conflicts played out 
more severely and led to delays in the implementation.  
Drivers of institutional change could be identified in situation where the 
interplay of international norms and government commitments weighed in the 
favor of policy implementation. International norms and attention created 
unifying moments between the coalitions and opened the opportunities to 
advance climate policy.  
 The potential for trade-offs between emissions reductions and poverty 
eradication measures only really emerged in the discourse of the carbon tax 
proposal. This trade-off referred mostly to the implementation of the carbon tax 
and the corresponding possibility of tariff increases. In the renewable energy 
sector, the only occurrence of poverty alleviation is implied in tariff increases as 
well. Win-win situations are possible in all cases. Offsetting is a viable option that 
pleases the industry, because it serves their interest of avoiding additional tax 
payments to the government and helps poor communities through clean 
technology projects similar to the Clean Development Mechanism. The success 
of an offsetting scheme that fulfills both objectives of emissions and poverty 
reduction depends on rigorous implementation capability.  
 Renewable energy in South Africa creates significant win-win situations. 
The plants come onto the grid quickly, while industrial development progresses 
slowly. The plants generate electricity into the grid at relatively low cost. The full 
potential of renewable energy, especially in residential and pro-poor use, are 
unlikely to be unlocked in South Africa. The opposition both in and outside the 
government advocating centralized “baseload” technologies remains very strong. 
Municipalities hesitate to offer net metering options to their residential customers 
due to their fear of revenue losses. The potential for win-win situations with 
renewable energy remains underexplored, because of the resistant elements 
within the political economy who continue to defend the status quo of fossil fuel 
combustion. Renewable energy could be particularly valuable  the residential, 
corporate and low income sectors by helping to alleviate the pressure on the 
national grid.  
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Neopatrimonial structures are characterized by a blend of formal and 
informal institutions. In the case of the carbon tax, this mix is likely to produce a 
formal tax that is undermined by informally negotiated sectorial exemptions.  The 
exemptions defeat the main purpose of the tax, which is behavioral change that 
leads to emissions reductions. The case study on renewable energy indicates a 
similar neopatrimonial structure, whereby decision-making takes place within a 
small circle of  government and elite actors without open stakeholder 
consultations.  
All three case studies show institutional change as “layering”, where new 
institutions are layered over existing institutions. The carbon tax built on an 
existing regime of environmental taxes and levies. The renewable energy program 
layered over the energy planning process, previous white papers and the 
attempted feed in tariff. The Climate Change White Paper built on the renewable 
energy and energy efficiency regimes as well as carbon pricing. Although it’s the 
first climate policy in the country, the White Paper serves as an umbrella 
document. It relies heavily on policies and their implementation in other 
departments. Yet, each policy has novel elements and fills niches. All three 
policies contribute to wider institutional change towards a low carbon 
development pathway.  
In sum our findings oppose the assumption established in the UNFCCC 
about trade-offs between mitigating climate change and reducing poverty, in 
middle income countries. Trade-offs between development and climate rarely 
hinder institutional change. The South African government received no financial 
or technological support from the international climate finance facilities to 
implement the renewable energy program, which resulted from a mainly 
domestic decision and international norms. Distributional conflicts are more 
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